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Recent Developments
CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION- EMPLOYER MAY
ESTABLISH VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM WITHIN AREA
OF DISCRETION GRANTED BY TITLE VII.
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber (U.S. 1979)
Brian Weber, a white male, filed suit on behalf of himself 1 and the class
of similarly situated nonminority employees 2 of Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corporation (Kaiser),3 alleging that the affirmative action plan in
Kaiser's collective bargaining agreement 4 established a racial quota system
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 5 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted
injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, 6 ruling that the voluntary affirmative action
plan, which required that preferential treatment be given to minority
1. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 763 (E.D. La. 1976),
aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO-CLC v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). Weber had been employed at Kaiser's Gramercy,
Louisiana, plant for approximately seven years at the time he filed suit. 415 F. Supp. at 763.
2. 415 F. Supp. at 763. The class was defined to include all of Kaiser's Gramercy workers
who were members of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO Local 5702, who were
not members of a minority group, and who had applied for and been rejected, or had been
eligible to apply for, on-the-job training programs since February 1, 1974. Id.
3. Id. The United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC (USWA), was also named as a
defendant. Id.
4. The collective bargaining agreement then in force required the establishment of goals
and timetables designed to achieve a 39% minority representation in the trade and craft jobs.
Id. at 763-64. The 39% goal was selected because approximately 40% of the population in the
area surrounding the plant were members of minority groups. Id. For each nonminority worker
chosen for the training program, at least one minority worker was to be selected until the
minority ratio goal had been attained. Id. at 763.
Kaiser requested bids on three training programs in April 1974, and, pursuant to the col-
lective bargaining agreement, selected the most senior person in each racial group on a one for
one basis. Id. at 764. In each case, at least one white employee having greater seniority than
the minority employee selected was not chosen for the training program, although he would
have been selected if the quota system had not been in effect. Id.
5. 415 F. Supp. at 765. The effective date of Title VII was July 2, 1965. Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716(a), 78 Stat. 266 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1976)).
6. Id. at 770. The court granted a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from
denying plaintiffs access to on-the-job training programs on the basis of race. Id. The injunction
was authorized by § 7 06(g) of Title VII, which provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer,
employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlaw-
ful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
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employees, violated sections 703(a) 7 and 703(d)8 of Title VII. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, maintaining that a
racial quota is illegal under Title VII absent a finding of prior discrimination
by the employer. 9 On writ of certiorari, 10 the United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Kaiser plan fell within the area of discretion left
by Title VII to industry to voluntarily adopt affirmative action plans designed
to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 99 S.
Ct. 2721 (1979).
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act) to eliminate perva-
sive discrimination against Negroes and other minorities." The purpose of
Title VII of the Act was to eliminate employment discrimination 12 on the
7. 415 F. Supp. at 769. Section 703(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race . . .; or
(2) to . . . classify his employees . . . in any way which would deprive . . . any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities . . . because of such individual's race ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
8. Section 703(d) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization or joint
labor management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training . . . to dis-
criminate against any individual because of his race . . . in admission to . . . any program
established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976).
The district court held that Kaiser's plan was invalid because only a court may devise an
affirmative action quota system, under Title VII. 415 F. Supp. at 767-68. Moreover, the court
maintained that such a plan would have been inappropriate for Kaiser's Gramercy plant because
the black employees being preferred over more senior white employees had never themselves
been personally discriminated against by Kaiser. Id. at 769.
9. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977). The Fifth
Circuit held that a bona fide seniority system could not be upset unless the minority employees
receiving preference had been previously denied their "rightful places" in the employment
scheme due to race discrimination. Id. at 225-26. The court reasoned that Title VII only permits
the use of voluntary affirmative action plans to eliminate unfair employment discrimination if
the employer had been guilty of discrimination in the past. Id. at 224. The district court had
found that Kaiser was not guilty of past discrimination. 415 F. Supp. at 761. However, it must
be noted that none of the parties had any reason to prove the existence of past discrimination.
See 563 F.2d at 231 (Wisdom, J., dissenting), If Kaiser or the union had proved their past
discrimination, they would have subjected themselves to potential damage suits by the victims
of such discrimination. Id. Moreover, Weber had no desire to weaken his case by proving that
Kaiser had discriminated in the past, since to do so would have legitimized the voluntary quota
system. Id. at 224-25.
The court of appeals rejected the district court's finding that any voluntary affirmative ac-
tion program created by an employer or a union is a per se violation of Title VII. Id. at 223.
The court noted that Title VII prefers voluntary compliance in eliminating discrimination rather
than court action. Id. The court did not, however, find it necessary at this time to distinguish
between permissible court enforced quotas and voluntary quota programs. Id. at 224.
10. 99 S. Ct. 720 (1979).
11. See 1 EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII & XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964, at 1-11 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1964].
12. See note 6 supra. Title VII's proscription of employment discrimination does not, how-
ever, forbid an employer from establishing bona fide occupational qualifications which are
reasonably necessary for his particular business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). Bona fide senior-
ity systems are protected so long as they are not designed, intended, or used to discriminate.
Id.
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basis of race, sex, or national origin. 3 Title VII, which covers most
employers engaged in "industry affecting Commerce," 14 authorizes a court
to enjoin such employers from engaging in discriminatory practices and to
order appropriate equitable relief, 15 including affirmative action. 16
Title VII also created and empowered the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to protect nonfederal employees' rights under Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5(a). In order to
obtain assistance from the EEOC, an aggrieved nonfederal employee is required to file a com-
plaint with the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe a violation
of Title VII has occurred, it may then bring a civil action against the employer if compliance
cannot be reached through informal methods of "conference, conciliation and persuasion." Id. §
2000e-5(b). The EEOC is also authorized to seek immediate injunctive relief prior to the final
disposition of the charge if necessary to carry out the purpose of the Act. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
Furthermore, Title VII permits an aggrieved person to institute a civil suit if charges are dis-
missed by the EEOC, or if the EEOC has not filed a civil action within 180 days from the filing
of the charge. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
13. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1964, supra note 11, at 2018. As the legislative history
of Title VII indicates, "the purpose of this title is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal
and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion
or national origin." I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1964, supra, at 2026. Many liberal members of
Congress believed that the bill as passed was too weak to accomplish its goals. Id. at 2122-23.
The Minority Report from the House Judiciary Committee, however, sets forth a different point
of view: "This legislation is the most radical proposal in the field of civil rights ever recom-
mended by any committee of the House or Senate." Id. at 2062.
The Senate debate on Title VII is of particular importance in interpreting the intent of
Congress. Usually, testimony of individual legislators, even committee members, is not a reliable
source to determine the intent of Congress as a whole. See G. FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
RESEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF LAwS 33-36 (1972). However, there are no Senate
Committee reports on Title VII because the House bill was sent directly to the Senate floor
without the usual Senate Committee procedures. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1964, supra, at
3001. Moreover, there are no joint committee reports because the full House passed the Senate
bill without amendments. Id. Therefore, the statements made during the general debate on
Title VII have taken on additional significance. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1965).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1976). The 1964 version of Title VII provided: "The term
employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting Commerce . . . , but such term does
not include . . . the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government .... or a
state or political subdivision thereof .... Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit.
VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253. In 1972, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to equal employment
opportunity by amending Title VII to, inter alia, expand the coverage of the Act. See H.R. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), reprinted in 2 EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 61 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1972]; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1972, supra, at 410. Under the amended version of Title VII, an "employer" may
be a "state or political subdivision thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1976). Federal employees
are also protected against discrimination under the amended version of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2 0 0 0
e-16 (1976).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 6 supra.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Title VII's delegation of authority to the courts to order
affirmative relief has raised the issue whether the courts can impose racial quotas. Prior to
Weber, the Court had never reviewed an employment discrimination case where this type of
relief was ordered by the court. But in an earlier school desegregation case, the Court upheld
the district court's integration plan which set as a goal the attainment of a specific balance. See
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Swann, the Court found
that the use of mathematical ratios is a valid starting point in shaping an equitable remedy. Id.
at 25. The Court also noted that once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been fulfilled and
1979-1980]
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The substantive issues raised by Title VII's prohibition of employment
discrimination first reached the Supreme Court in the 1971 decision of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 1 7  The Griggs Court held that an employer may
not require qualifications for jobs which operate to exclude minorities, unless
the employer can show that the qualifications are related to job perform-
ance. 18 In so holding, the Court stated: "[T]he Act does not command that
any person be hired simply ... because he was a member of a minority
group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed." 19 The court concluded
that the objective of Congress in passing Title VII "was to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees." 20 Furthermore, the Griggs Court held that a violation of sec-
tion 703(h) of Title VII may be proved without showing that the employer
intended to violate the Act.2 1
After Griggs, the Supreme Court on several occasions has considered
the nature and scope of relief under Title VII. 2 2  In one case, the Court
discrimination by official action eliminated, there will be no further need for the courts to
interfere. Id. at 32.
Similarly, in cases dealing with reapportionment of voting districts under the Voting Rights
Act of 1965,'42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1976), the Supreme Court has accepted the use of racial
quotas even absent a specific finding of past discrimination. See United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). Moreover, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), five justices tacitly approved the use of racial quotas provided there was an
administrative, legislative, or judicial finding of past discrimination. Id. at 307. For a discussion
of Bakke, see notes 32-37 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the indirect effects of
Weber on the quotas issue, see note 4 supra; notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
17. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The employer in Griggs required both a high school diploma and a
satisfactory score on two professionally prepared tests to obtain the higher paying jobs at the
company. Id. at 427-28. An employee hired prior to 1965 without a high school diploma could
obtain a transfer to one of the desirable positions only by passing the two tests. Id. at 428.
18. Id. at 436. The district court had dismissed the complaint because it had found that the
employer's racial discrimination occurred prior to the effective date of Title VII. 292 F. Supp.
243 (1968), modified, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See note 5
supra. The district court reasoned that since Title VII is not retroactive, the Act was not vio-
lated by the prior discriminatory practices. 292 F. Supp. at 247. Although the court of appeals
agreed with the district court, that the Act does not apply to discrimination that occurred prior
to 1965, it found that the employer did not violate Title VII because the employer had no
discriminatory purpose or intent in his testing requirements. 420 F.2d at 1230, 1235. The Su-
preme Court, on the other hand, found that the two professionally prepared tests were not job
related and, therefore, were invalid. 401 U.S. at 431-32.
19. 401 U.S. at 430-31 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 429-30.
21. Id. at 432. Section 703(h) provides in pertinent part:
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon
the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its ad-
ministration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate
because of race ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). For the text of § 703(h), see note 35 infra.
The Griggs Court interpreted the phrase "used to discriminate" to mean that if racial dis-
crimination is a consequence of the test, the employer's good intent is irrelevant. 401 U.S. at
432-33.
22. See notes 23-31 and accompanying text infra. One issue concerning relief under Title
VII that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed involves the authority of the EEOC to
[VOL. 25: p. 141
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held that a plaintiff is not precluded from Title VII relief merely because he
had previously attempted to obtain relief from the alleged discriminatory
practice through union grievance procedures. 23 Also, the Court has upheld
the granting of back pay 24 and of retroactive seniority status 25 as proper
require affirmative relief in a consent decree. See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d
167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978) (circuit court upheld, against union chal-
lenge, a consent decree which required quotas in future hiring); EEOC v. Jersey Central Power
& Light Co., 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 987 (1976) (Su-
preme Court vacated the circuit court decision which had rejected portions of a consent decree
that adversely affected the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, and re-
manded for reconsideration in light of Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)).
For a discussion of Franks, see note 25 and accompanying text infra. A consent decree is the
result of the eflorts ot the EEOC, pursuant to its power under § 706(b), to seek a resolution to
the unlawful employment charge through "conference, conciliation and persuasion." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1976). In light of Jersey Central Power & Light and American Tel. & Tel. Co., it
would appear that the Supreme Court believes that consent decrees may contain affirmative
relief, including grants of constructive seniority, notwithstanding the provisions of § 703(h)
which outlaw any employment practices that "discriminate because of race [or] color." 42
U.S.C. 2000e-2(h). For the text of § 703(h), see note 25 infra.
23. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Alexander, the district court
had held that the petitioner was precluded from bringing suit under Title VII because he had
voluntarily chosen to seek a remedy through the grievance provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo.), affd, 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'd,
415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "[c]ooperation and voluntary
compliance were selected as the preferred means" to assure equal employment opportunity. 415
U.S. at 44. The Court reasoned that if Title VII was construed to foreclose a party from suing
under the Act only because he had previously tried to settle the dispute without the aid of a
court, the "possibility of voluntary compliance or settlement of Title VII claims would thus be
reduced, and the result could well be more litigation. ... Id. at 59.
24. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Court explained that the
purpose of awarding back pay was to provide employers with incentive to voluntarily eliminate
discriminatory practices, rather than allowing them to wait for a court to force their compliance
with the Act by the imposition of injunctive relief and large judgment awards. Id. at 418.
25. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). In Franks, the district court found
that Bowman's policies for hiring and discharging over-the-road truckers discriminated on the
basis of race. Id. at 751 (the district court opinion was unpublished). The district court enjoined
Bowman from perpetuating the discriminatory practices and ordered that members of the in-
jured class be notified of their right to priority consideration for the jobs. Id. However, the
lower courts denied the grant of seniority status retroactive to the date of application for the
over-the-road jobs. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the award of retroactive
seniority was necessary to put the injured persons into their "rightful place." Id. at 768, 770.
The Court explained that, otherwise, a party subject to discrimination would never be entitled
to the benefits which his subordinates have obtained despite the seniority that he was wrong-
fully denied. Id. at 767-68.
Moreover, the Court maintained that § 703, which defines unlawful employment practices,
does not modify or restrict the scope of equitable relief which a court can order pursuant to
§ 7 06(g) to remedy violations of Title VII. Id. at 758-59. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to -2(h)
(1976). In particular, § 703(h) provides in pertinent part that
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, pro-
vided that such diffeerences [sic] are not the result of an intention to discriminate because
of race, [or] color ....
Id. § 2000e-2(h). The Court found that § 703(h) was not intended to limit or qualify the relief
granted by § 706(g), the remedial section of Title VII. See 424 U.S. at 758-62. For the text of
§ 706(g), see note 6 supra.
1979-19801
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remedies for violations of Title VII, and as appropriate incentives for
employers to voluntarily eliminate discriminatory practices.2 6 However, in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,2 7 the Court lim-
ited the scope of Title VII relief, holding that a bona fide seniority system
remains unaffected by Title VII, even though it perpetuates the effects of
pre-Title VII discriminatory practices z. 2  Additionally, the Court clarified
the power of lower courts to impose hiring schemes upon employers in
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters.2 9  Nonetheless, in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 30 the Court, for the first time, specifi-
cally held that Title VII is applicable to discrimination against members of
the majority white race as well as against members of minority groups. 31
The applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to discrimination against
whites arose again last term in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke. 32  The Bakke Court 33 determined that Title V1 34 incorporated the
26. See note 25 supra.
27. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
28. Id. The employer and the union in Teamsters were found to have discriminated against
Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons by hiring them for less desirable and lower paying jobs
than were given to white employees. Id. at 337. The remedy awarded by the Court for the
post-Act discrimination was the grant of retroactive seniority to the victims of the unlawful
conduct. Id. at 347-48. The Supreme Court refused to set aside the entire seniority system,
even though it had the effect of perpetuating pre-Act discrimination, because the seniority sys-
tem was protected by § 703(h). Id. at 356. The Court also held that an employer's change in
hiring practices does not provide adequate relief for those who suffered from discrimination in
the past. Id. at 341-42.
29. 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The employer in Furnco hired bricklayers whom he knew to
be experienced or who had been recommended to him. Id. at 570. Job applications were not
accepted at the site. Id. The company had a policy of hiring at least 16% black bricklayers-a
figure in excess of the percentage of black bricklayers in the union, the union being 5.7%
minority. Id. at 571-72. The plaintiffs were qualified black bricklayers who applied for jobs at
the gate and were refused. Id. at 569. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's finding
that each of the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie claim under Title VII by showing "(i) that
he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of complainant's qualifications." 438 U.S. 575 (footnote omitted), quoting
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court reversed the appellate court's imposition of a new hiring procedure, holding that a court
may not impose a remedy upon an employer until an actual violation of Title VII has been
proved. Id. at 578.
30. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
31. Id. at 279. In McDonald, two white employees and one black employee had been
charged with misappropriating their employer's property, but only the whites were fired. Id. at
276. The white employees then brought an action under Title VII and under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). 427 U.S. at 276. The employer's defense was that the
firings were justified by the misconduct of the petitioners. Id. at 281. The Court agreed that
misconduct of an employee may render him unqualified, but "this criterion must be 'applied,
alike to members of all races.' " Id. at 283, quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 804 (1973). As the Court noted, however, the actions of the employer in McDonald
were not part of an affirmative action program. Id. at 280-81 n.8.
32. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33. Justice Powell announced the decision of the Court. Id. at 265. Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, White and Blackmun [hereinafter referred to as the Brennan group] concurred with Jus-
tice Powell in upholding the permissibility of considering race in university admission decisions.
Id. at 325.
[VOL. 25: p. 141
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constitutional standards of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment,3 5 and therefore did not per se require the termination of fed-
eral funds to parties who discriminate in favor of minorities in order to rem-
edy the effects of prior discrimination. 3 6 Nevertheless, the Court held that
the program established by the University of California at Davis, which set
aside a specified number of places in the incoming medical school class for
minority students, violated the equal protection clause.3 7
34. The section of Title VI that was challenged in Bakke, § 601, provides: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program, or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
35. 438 U.S. at 281-87. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides:
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court held that only racial classifications which violate the
equal protection clause or the fifth amendment violate Title VI. 438 U.S. at 287; id. at 328
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. 438 U.S. at 320. Justice Powell, joined by the Brennan group, found that racial distinc-
tions are "inherently suspect," but may be considered in admissions programs if the state can
show a substantial interest to justify the use of such a suspect classification. Id. at 320. Justice
Powell then applied the strict scrutiny test in assessing the purported purpose for the special
admissions program, concluding that the state has a compelling interest in obtaining a diverse
student body to enhance the educational atmosphere of its universities. Id. at 306-15. Neverthe-
less, Justice Powell maintained that the Davis program of setting aside a specific number of
places for racial minorities was not the least drastic means to accomplish this purpose. Id. at
319-20.
The Brennan group, however, rejected the use of the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 356-62
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Their "intermediate" test required that
an "important and articulated purpose" be shown to justify the use of the racial classification, id.
at 361 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and that the classification be
used reasonably in light of the program's objectives. Id. at 373-74 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The Brennan group found that the Davis program was designed to
remedy the effects of past societal discrimination against minorities in education and in the
medical profession and that this satisfied their intermediate test. Id. at 370-71 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
While Justice Powell agreed with the Brennan group that the state has a legitimate and
substantial interest in eliminating the effects of identified discrimination, he did not think that a
university was competent to determine if an identifiable discrimination had occurred, nor to
create a remedy for the victims which would not substantially harm other innocent persons. Id.
at 307-10. Justice Powell maintained that such determinations must be made by judicial, legisla-
tive, or administrative findings. Id. at 307-08.
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist [here-
inafter referred to as the Stevens group], dissented from this interpretation, insisting that the
constitutional analysis was inappropriate since the language of the statute clearly "prohibits the
exclusion of individuals from federally funded programs because of their race." id. at 418 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Neither the Brennan group nor Justice
Powell addressed the Stevens group's contention that when the words of a statute are clear
there is no need to consider constitutional claims. Id. at 412. (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
37. Id. at 320. For more thorough discussions of Bakke, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw (1979 Supp.); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RICHTS, TOWARD AN UN-
DERSTANDING OF BAKKE (1979); E. Maltz, A Bakke Primer, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 119 (1979); A
Symposium: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1979);
Bakke Symposium, 14 HAtsv. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1 (1979); E.E.O.C. Symposium, 21 How. L.J.
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Against this background, Justice Brennan began the majority opinion in
Weber"aa by noting that the Court was considering only "the narrow statu-
tory issue of whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from
voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial
preferences .... "39 As the majority pointed out, the case did not involve
a fourteenth amendment claim, 40 nor did it deal with the issue of court-
imposed remedies for violations of Title VII. 41
Turning to the issue at bar, the Court rejected Weber's argument that
sections 7 03(a) and 703(d) of Title V11 42 should be read literally to forbid
discrimination in hiring against whites as well as blacks. 43 Stating that a
statute must be construed in light of its legislative history, 44 Justice Brennan
surveyed the history and found that the purpose of Title VII was tb enable
blacks to obtain opportunities in areas of employment which have tradition-
ally been closed to them. 45  The majority then found support in the House
Report 4 6 for its position that Congress did not intend to prohibit private,
voluntary affirmative action plans. 47 The House Report, according to Justice
Brennan, expressed the view that Title VII would not cure all racial dis-
38. 99 S. Ct. at 2724. Justice Brennan was joined in the 5-2 majority opinion by Justices
Stewart, White, Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring opinion.
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, joined in by Chief Justice Burger who also filed a
separate dissent. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision because he had been coun-
sel to Kaiser in the past. NEWSWEEK, July 9, 1979, at 78. Justice Powell did not participate
because he had been ill during the oral argument of the case. Id.
39. 99 S. Ct. at 2726 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 2726. Since the Kaiser-USWA plan did not involve state action, the Court was not
faced with an alleged violation of the equal protection clause. The Court noted that Title VII
"was enacted pursuant to the Commerce power to regulate purely private decisionmaking and
was not intended to incorporate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments." Id. at 2729 n.6. Contrasting Title VII with the Title VI provisions considered in
Bakke, the Weber Court stated that "Title VI was an exercise of federal power over a matter in
which the Federal Government was already directly involved," because Title VI governs the
receipt of federal funds. Id. Therefore, the Bakke decision, which found that Title VI incorpo-
rated the standards of the fourteenth amendment, see note 35 and accompanying text supra,
had no bearing upon the Court's analysis in Weber.
41. Id. at 2726. The Supreme Court has validated court-imposed affirmative action plans
pursuant to § 706(g) of Title VII. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). For the text of § 7 06 (g), see
note 6 supra. For a discussion of Teamsters, see notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra. For
a discussion of Franks, see note 25 and accompanying text supra.
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), -2(d) (1976). For the text of these sections, see notes 7 & 8
supra.
43. 99 S. Ct. at 2726. Justice Brennan distinguished McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), on the ground that McDonald did not involve "an affirmative action
plan voluntarily adopted by private parties to eliminate traditional patterns of racial segrega-
tion." 99 S. Ct. at 2726. For a discussion of McDonald, see notes 30-31 and accompanying text
supra.
44. 99 S. Ct. at 2727. Justice Brennan noted that "[it is a 'familiar rule, that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
within the intention of its makers.' " Id., quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
45. 99 S. Ct. at 2728-30. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
46. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF 1964, supra note 11, at 2018.
47. 99 S. Ct. at 2728-29.
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crimination, but would create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary resolu-
tion of discriminatory practices. 48  Justice Brennan found it inconceivable
that a law enacted at the apex of the civil rights movement to benefit victims
of centuries of racial discrimination should be interpreted to forbid private
and voluntary efforts to "abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation." 
49
In further support of its conclusion that private, voluntary affirmative
action is permissible, the Court relied upon section 703(j) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.50 While noting that this section does not require
any employer to give preferential treatment to minorities in order to achieve
racial balance, the Court also pointed out that section 703(j) does not specifi-
cally forbid such action by employers. 51 Thus, the Court concluded that
the Kaiser plan fell "within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the
48. Id. at 2728. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963), reprinted in 1 LEGIs-
LATIVE HISTORY OF 1964, supra note 11, at 2018.
49. 99 S. Ct. at 2728. The Weber majority relied upon Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975), to support its finding that Congress did not intend to prohibit the use of
voluntary measures designed to eliminate "the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious
page in this country's history." 99 S. Ct. at 2728, quoting 422 U.S. at 418. The majority in
Weber interpreted Albemarle to indicate that Congress would not have provided for broad
equitable relief in § 706(g) of Title VII, including back pay and other affirmative relief, unless
Congress intended that the few suits which were actually brought would spur others to correct
their violations voluntarily. 99 S. Ct. at 2728. For the text of § 706(g), see note 6 supra. Limited
relief, such as cease and desist orders, would have stopped individual employers from continu-
ing their discriminatory practices but would have had little effect on other employers since they
would be given no economic incentive to cease their prior practices.
50. 99 S. Ct. at 27-28. Section 703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this subehapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to
this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or
classifed for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to
membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any
apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percent-
age of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community,
State, section, or other area, or in the available work Force in any community, State,
section or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976) (emphasis added). The Court noted that § 703(j) does not limit a
court's ability to impose equitable relief for injured parties under § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1976). 99 S. Ct. at 2728 n.5. For the text of § 706(g), see note 6 supra. See also Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977). Moreover, in an
earlier Title VII case, Justice Brennan had read § 706(g) as giving the courts wide discretion in
remedying the effects of past discrimination. See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 770 (1976);
note 25 supra.
51. 99 S. Ct. at 2729. The majority concluded that § 703j) was added to Title VII to assure
operators of private businesses that the federal government would not unduly interfere in their
management decisions, so that businesses could freely determine whether they desired to ra-
cially balance their work force with an affirmative action plan. Id. One commentator has
reasoned that § 703(j) should be read literally because the legislative history pertaining to that
section was in conflict. Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualijications, 7 B.C. INDUS. &
CoM. L. REV. 473, 490-91 (1965). Thus, according to this view, the majority was justified in
limiting its analysis to the text of § 703(j).
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private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to elimi-
nate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories." 
52
Limiting its decision to the facts of the Kaiser plan, the Court declined
to articulate a precise, all-encompassing test for determining the permissibil-
ity of other types of affirmative action schemes. 53 Rather, the Court simply
listed the four positive aspects of the Kaiser plan which led it to conclude
that this particular scheme was permissible: 1) the plan was designed to give
minorities employment opportunities in traditionally segregated job
classes; 54 2) no majority workers need be fired or demoted to make room for
minority employees; 5 5 3) the plan does not absolutely bar the advancement of
white employees; 56 and 4) the plan is temporary, terminating when the goal of
39% minority craftsmen is achieved. 57
Both Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger filed strong dissents,
challenging the validity of the majority's interpretation of the legislative his-
tory. 58 Justice Rehnquist argued that the language of sections 703(a) 59 and
703(d) 60 clearly prohibits racial discrimination against whites as well as
blacks. 61 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist found that the legislative history 62
52. 99 S. Ct. at 2730 (footnote omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. The Court took judicial notice of the lack of minorities in craft unions. Id. at 2725
n.1.
55. Id. at 2730.
56. Id. The plan merely requires that for every white worker chosen for the training pro-
gram, one minority worker must also be selected. 563 F.2d at 218. In other words, 50% of
those given the opportunity to learn a new trade would be white. Id. It should be noted that
because Kaiser had only hired experienced craft workers prior to the adoption of this program,
none of these inexperienced employees would have been eligible for the craft jobs if Kaiser had
not instituted the affirmative action plan. Id. at 234 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
57. 99 S. Ct. at 2730. See note 4 supra.
58. See 99 S. Ct. at 2734-35 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2736-37 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
59. For the text of § 703(a), see note 7 supra.
60. For the text of § 703(d), see note 8 supra.
61. Id. at 2741 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist analogized what he considered
the "dramatic" and "unremarked" switch in the majority's interpretation of Title VII to the
rhetorical meandering of a "1984" Orwellian government official who changes enemies in mid-
sentence without breaking syntax. Id., citing G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 182-83
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1949). Consequently, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the
majority opinion was five years ahead of its time. 99 S. Ct. at 2736 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2737, 2741-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist embarked upon
a thorough search of the legislative history of Title VII and concluded that the 1964 Congress
did not intend to allow preferential treatment in employment based on race. Id. at 2752 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stressed the importance of the Minority Report's claim
that Title VII would allow federal agencies to interpret "the word 'discrimination' to mean the
existence of 'racial imbalance,' [and] would 'require' employers to grant preferential treatment to
minorities," until a racial balance existed in the work force. Id. at 2742, 2745 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-68 (1963), reprinted in 1 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF 1964, supra note 11, at 2067-68. The response to this suggestion by the
Act's supporters was that Title VII does not "require" every employer to give preferential
treatment to minority groups in order to establish a racial balance, nor does it allow federal
agencies to demand that an employer meet a racial quota. 99 S. Ct. at 2745 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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and the precedent 63 clearly showed that the purpose of Title VII was to
forbid all racial discrimination in employment, including any acts of an
employer to correct racial imbalances. 64 Justice Rehnquist also criticized
the Court for ignoring the language, legislative history, and purpose of sec-
tion 703(j). 65 He maintained that section 703(j) was included in Title VII to
alleviate the fears of Congress that the Act would result in preferential
treatment to create racial balances in the work force. 66  Under Justice Rehn-
quist's analysis, voluntary preferential treatment is not mentioned in section
703(j) because such action is the type of racial discrimination which section
703(a) specifically prohibits. 67
Justice Rehnquist maintained that the history behind § 703(j) enforces his contention that
Title VII tolerates no voluntary racial preferences. Id. at 2749 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For
the text of § 703(j), see note 50 supra. Justice Rehnquist contended that the reason no one
suggested in the 83 days of debate over Title VII that employers would be permitted to volun-
tarily prefer racial minorities over white persons is that such a proposition would have been
preposterous in light of § 703(a). Id. at 2748-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist's reading of the legislative history does not materially differ from the
majority's reading, except for Justice Rehnquist's finding that § 703(j) is addressed solely to
federal agencies and courts, and cannot be read to support activity by an employer which is
prohibited by § 703(a). Id. at 2752 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. 99 S. Ct. 2736-37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court for
ignoring the Court's prior interpretation of Title VII merely to achieve a result more acceptable
to the majority. 99 S. Ct. at 2736 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist cited McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), to support his view that the Court has
repeatedly interpreted Title VII to prohibit "all racial discrimination in employment, without
exception for any particular employee." 99 S. Ct. at 2736 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), quoting
427 U.S. at 283 (emphasis in original). Justice Rehnquist also pointed to the Court's decision in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which interpreted Title VII to forbid "[d]is-
criminatory preference for any group, minority or majority." 99 S. Ct. at 2736 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), quoting 401 U.S. at 431. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist intimated that the Court's
most recent discussion of the issue in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978),
should have been dispositive of Weber for, in Furnco, the Court had stated: "It is clear beyond
cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each appli-
cant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant'5 race are already
proportionally represented in the work force." 99 S. Ct. at 2736 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
quoting 438 U.S. at 579. Thus, Justice Rehnquist chided the majority for not providing an
adequate explanation for this abrupt change in its construction of Title VII. 99 S. Ct. at 2736-37
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, as Justice Rehnquist indicated, the majority opinion did not
even mention, much less distinguish, Griggs and Furnco. Id. at 2736 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
For a discussion of Griggs, see notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion
of Furnco, see note 29 and accompanying text supra.
64. 99 S. Ct. at 2741 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 2737, 2739-40, 2748-51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2748-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. Id. Justice Rehnquist also contested the majority's assumption that Kaiser had voluntar-
ily adopted the challenged plan. Id. at 2737-38, 2749 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehn-
quist argued that Kaiser's adoption of the plan was induced by pressure from the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC). Id. The OFCC is a federal agency authorized to condi-
tion the granting of federal contracts upon compliance with an executive order requiring con-
tract applicants to take affirmative action to prevent employment discrimination. See Executive
Order 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232
(1976), as amended by Executive Order 11375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-70 Compilation), and Execu-
tive Order 12086, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1978). The OFCC had found that minorities were being
"underutilized" in Kaiser's plants, and thus, exerted pressure on Kaiser to institute an admis-
sions quota system preferring blacks over whites. 99 S. Ct. at 2749 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Agreeing with Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the majority opinion
is contrary to the explicit language of Title VII, Chief Justice Burger main-
tained that the Court's decision was "arrived at by means wholly incompati-
ble with long-established principles of separation of powers." 68  Justice
Burger asserted that since the intent of Congress is clear from the face of
Title VII, there is no need to look at the legislative history. 69 Thus, Chief
Justice Burger maintained that the majority had usurped the legislature's
role by amending the clear language of the statute to suit its personal pref-
erence. 
7 0
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion based on a "practical and
equitable" reading of Title VII. 71 While Justice Blackmun was disturbed by
the majority's expansive reading of the relief permissible under Title VII, 72
he also maintained that the dissent had erred in failing to consider the
Court's prior limited reading of the Act's legislative history. 73
Setting forth his own approach to the issue at bar, Justice Blackmun
found difficulty in reading Title VII literally, noting that if an employer who
has discriminated against minorities fails to take voluntary affirmative action,
he subjects himself to suit for a Title VII violation and possibly a court-
imposed affirmative action plan. 74  On the other hand, if the employer vol-
untarily takes action, he is subject to suit by majority employees claiming
reverse discrimination under section 703(a). 75  Justice Blackmun's proposed
68. Id. at 2734 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2734-35 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2730 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 2732 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun was concerned with the majori-
ty's finding that a minority preference is valid whenever "there has been a societal history of
purposeful exclusion of blacks from the job category," which results in a racial imbalance in that
trade. Id. Justice Blackmun felt that Congress intended Title VII to prohibit hiring preferences
for blacks as well as whites, unless that principle is being set aside to encourage "voluntary
compliance that mitigates 'arguable violations.' " Id. See note 75 infra.
73. 99 S. Ct. at 2733-34 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun maintained that in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-36 & n.l (1971), the Court refused to give
controlling weight to the memorandum of Senators Clark and Case which the dissent quoted in
support of its position that Title VII should not result in preferential treatment to minorities. 99
S. Ct. at 2733-34 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See id. at 2745-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun concluded that the passages of legislative history quoted by the dissent were
not so compelling as to override the equity of permitting employers to ameliorate the effects of
past discrimination. Id. at 2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
74. 99 S. Ct. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For the remedial provisions of Title VII,
see note 6 supra. Justice Blackmun found that no party in this case had any desire to prove that
Kaiser discriminated in hiring or promoting minority workers. 99 S. Ct. at 2733 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). See note 9 supra.
75. 99 S. Ct. at 2730 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun maintained that this
dilemma forces the employer and the union to walk "a 'high tightrope without a net beneath
them.' " Id. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring), quoting Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 563 F.2d at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). While recognizing that Congress intended for
employers to voluntarily comply with the provisions of Title VII, Justice Blackmun indicated
that Congress cannot expect employers to do so if, in the process, they open themselves up to
reverse discrimination suits. Id. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44
(1974); Chen, The Case for Minority Participation in Reverse Discrimination Litigation, 67
CALIF. L. REV. 191 (1978). Thus, Justice Blackmun espoused the "arguable violation" theory
developed by Judge Wisdom in his dissent from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Weber. 99 S. Ct.
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solution to this dilemma was that an employer should be permitted to take
voluntary affirmative action if he has committed an "arguable violation" of
Title VII. 7
6
Although the majority was not totally convincing in its argument that
the legislative history behind Title VII supports the use of voluntary affirma-
tive action plans, 77 it is submitted that the Weber Court reached the result
most consistent with Title VII's underlying purposes of providing equal
at 2731-32 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See 563 F.2d at 230-34 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun concluded that an employer who finds that he has committed an "arguable violation"
of Title VII should be able to mend his ways without fear of suit by white employees and
without having to identify the actual victims of past discrimination, thereby avoiding claims for
backpay. 99 S. Ct. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
76. 99 S. Ct. at 2732 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See note 75 supra. Justice Blackmun ob-
served that the easiest method of establishing an "arguable violation" would be by showing a
statistical disparity between the racial composition of the employer's workforce and the composi-
tion of the qualified local labor force. Id. at 2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court has
accepted this statistical disparity analysis as a means for a Title VII plaintiff to set out a prima
facie case of discrimination, thereby transferring the burden to the employer to show bona fide
reasons for the disproportionate number of minority employees in his workforce. See Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Justice Blackmun believed that the majority's broader holding, allowing affirmative action
plans whenever the job category in question is "traditionally segregated," fit into his narrower
"arguable violation" theory under the facts of this case. 99 S. Ct. at 2732-34 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). He reasoned that determining whether a job class is "traditionally segregated" does
not differ in practice from determining if there is an "arguable violation," since both approaches
inevitably look at the statistical breakdown of the work force. Id. at 2732-33 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). However, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority opinion departed from the
"arguable violation" approach by allowing an affirmative action plan to redress discriminatory
practices which predate the Act. Id. at 2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Nevertheless, Justice
Blackmun maintained that even though Title VII does not give minorities a remedy for pre-Act
discrimination, "[sitrong considerations of equity support an interpretation of Title VII that
would permit affirmative action to reach where Title VII itself does not." Id.
77. The Court purportedly based its conclusion on the legislative history of Title VII and the
literal language of § 703(j). 99 S. Ct. at 2727-29. See notes 43-52 and accompanying text supra.
Nevertheless, the Court's thorough search of the voluminous Title VII legislative history re-
vealed only one statement that arguably supports its conclusion:
No Bill can or should lay claim to eliminating the causes and consequences of racial and
other types of discrimination against minorities. There is reason to believe, however, that
national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the
most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local
resolution of other forms of discrimination.
99 S. Ct. at 2728 (emphasis supplied by the Court), quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 18 (1963), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1964, supra note 11, at 2001. This
language, however, can reasonably be interpreted to indicate that the House Judiciary Commit-
tee hoped that employers would voluntarily stop their discriminatory hiring practices, rather
than voluntarily provide redress for their past discriminatory acts by affording preferences to
present minority employees. If employers did actually cease their unlawful hiring practices upon
the passage of Title VII, as Congress had hoped, they would be immune from suit under Title
VII because no remedy is available for discriminatory practices which predate the Act. Hazel-
wood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1977). It seems likely that Congress
believed that employers would stop discriminating against minorities by granting them job op-
portunities and, therefore, only those employers who failed to voluntarily heed the message of




Tannenbaum: Civil Rights - Employment Discrimination - Employer May Establish
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
employment opportunity to all races and of remedying the effects of dis-
crimination for those already adversely affected. 78  The Supreme Court has
previously stated that the purpose of the grant of broad remedial powers in
section 706 was to enable courts to fashion remedies which will "provide the
spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate so far as possible, the
last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's his-
tory." 79  As Justice Blackmun observed, if an employer must fear "reverse
discrimination" suits in the event that he chooses to voluntarily remedy the
effects of his prior discriminatory acts, he will choose not to act at all.8°
Placing the employer in such a predicament would, it is submitted, be con-
trary to the congressional intent of creating an atmosphere conducive to vol-
untary compliance with Title VII.8L
It is suggested that the majority's most convincing rationale is that the
language of section 703(j), which provides that "nothing in this statute shall
be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treat-
ment," 82 indicates that an employer may choose to give preferential treat-
ment to achieve racial balance, but that governmental agencies may not re-
It is submitted that in 1964, as Justice Blackmun concluded in his concurring opinion,
Congress probably did not even consider the possibility that racial preferences would ever be
offered to minority members. 99 S. Ct. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice
Powell stated in Bakke that, when Congress enacted Title VI, "[tIhere simply was no reason for
Congress to consider the validity of hypothetical preferences that might be accorded minority
citizens; the legislators were dealing with the real and pressing problem of how to guarantee
those citizens equal treatment." 438 U.S. at 285.
78. See notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra. After an initial reading of Weber, the
question arises as to why Justice Stewart changed his position from that which he had taken in
Bakke. Justice Stewart was the fifth member of the 5-2 majority in Weber. See note 36 supra.
In Bakke, however, he had joined in the opinion of Justice Stevens which concluded that the
language of Title VI was "crystal clear: Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from
participation in a federally funded program." 418 U.S. at 417-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens did not believe that the legislative history of Title VI
required a reading other than "its natural meaning." Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). It cannot be disputed that the literal meaning of the words of §§ 703(a)
and 703(d) of Title VII are not significantly different than those of § 601 of Title VI. For the text
of § 703(a), see note 7 supra. For the text of § 703(d), see note 8 supra. For the text of § 601,
see note 34 supra. Therefore, Justice Stewart must have relied on other provisions in Title VII,
or on its legislative history, in order to find that the intent of Congress differed from Title VI to
Title VII. It is submitted that the extensive remedial provisions in § 706(g) of Title VII provide
an adequate basis for finding that Congress intended to promote voluntary compliance with the
Act. For portions of the text of § 706(g), see note 6 supra. Congress considered it necessary to
set up enforcement provisions in Title VII which protect the victims of discrimination through
awards such as back pay and constructive seniority if their Title VII rights are violated. See,
notes 6 & 16 and accompanying text supra. As the Court observed in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the
preferred means for achieving this goal." Id. at 44.
79. Albemarle Paper Co., v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (emphasis added), quoting
United States v. W.L. Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of
Albemarle, see note 24 supra.
80. 99 S. Ct. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
81. See notes 24 & 79 and accompanying text supra.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976). For the text of § 703(j), see note 50 supra.
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quire him to do so. 83 However, it is unclear from the majority's analysis
why it was willing to look behind the text of sections 703(a) and (d),84 but
was unwilling to go beyond the literal language of section 703(j). 85 It is
submitted that the majority was justified in considering just the literal lan-
guage of section 703(j) because the only relevant legislative history was am-
biguous. Senator Humphrey, for instance, thought that section 703(j) was
not necessary since it did not add any further prohibitions to Title VII.8 6
Senators Clark and Case, however, maintained that Title VII prohibited any
deliberate attempt by employers to attain a racial balance. 87  If one consid-
ers the interpretation of Senators Clark and Case to be correct, section
703(j) would prohibit voluntary plans; 88 but if Senator Humphrey's interpre-
tation is the proper reading, then section 703(j) should be read literally.8 9
Thus, it is suggested that the majority relied on a basic rule of statutory
interpretation, which requires that the plain meaning of the statute should
be followed when the legislative history is ambiguous. 90 Accordingly, the
Court could properly consider the legislative history behind sections 703(a)
and (d) because that legislative history was clear and aided the Court in
discovering the true intent of Congress. 91
While the dissent's discussion of the legislative history of Title VII ap-
pears persuasive, 92 it is submitted that the discussion addresses what is not
required by Title VII, rather than what Title VII forbids. 93  Moreover, it is
submitted that the dissent, in failing to examine the legislative history be-
hind the 1972 amendments to Title VII, 94 did not consider the total picture.
83. See 99 S. Ct. at 2728-29; notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
84. See 99 S. Ct. at 2727, citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892); notes 42-49 and accompanying text supra.
85. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra. Justice Brennan explained that § 703(j)
was incorporated into Title VII to assure private employers that the federal government would
not force them to adopt affirmative action plans simply "because of some Federal employee's
ideas about racial balance or imbalance." 99 S. Ct. at 2729, quoting 110 CONG. REC. 14,314
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Miller). In his dissent, justice Rehnquist argued that the majority had
invoked § 703(j) to uphold the type of plan that the section was designed to forbid, concluding
that the Office of Federal Contract Compliance had forced Kaiser to adopt an affirmative action
plan. Id. at 2749 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also text accompanying notes 65-67 supra. It is
possible that although Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the facts in Weber may have been correct,
the majority's theoretical analysis of § 703(j) was entirely consistent with the legislative history
of that section. See notes 86-91 and accompanying text infra.
86. See 110 CONG. REc. 12,723 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
87. See 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (remarks of Sens. Clark and Case).
88. It should be noted that if the interpretation of Senators Clark and Case was correct,
then § 703(j) should be read "nothing shall require or permit."
89. See Rachlin, supra note 51, at 490.
90. See W. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: HOW TO USE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
106 (1975).
91. See text accompanying note 84 supra; notes 42-49 and accompanying text supra.
92. See 99 S. Ct. at 2735 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2741-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing);. notes 58, 62 & 64-67 and accompanying text supra.
93. 99 S. Ct. at 2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94. The first amendments to Title VII were enacted in 1972 after much debate over whether
affirmative action was a proper remedy for violations of the Act. See generally LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1972; supra note 13, vols. 2-3.
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In 1972, attempts to amend Title VII to prohibit the use of affirmative action
as a remedy failed. 95 It is clear that the majority of Congress chose not to
overturn prior judicial decisions which allowed race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion plans to remedy discriminatory acts. 96 Therefore, it is apparent that
the 1972 Congress thought that the courts were properly interpreting Title
VII as passed in 1964.
It is further submitted that the dissent failed to take into account the
limited scope of the majority's decision. The majority did not permit an af-
firmative action plan whose sole purpose was to maintain a racial balance;
rather, it allowed a plan which sought to remedy the effects of a "tradition-
ally segregated" job class.9 7 Under Weber, an employer may enact an af-
firmative action plan if his work force in a particular area has a significantly
smaller percentage of minority workers than the general labor force in the
area. 98 It is suggested that the employer must also have acted in the past in
a manner which contributed to the disproportionate amount of minority
workers in the particular job class.99 A plan instituted solely to maintain a
racial balance, unlike a plan designed for remedial purposes, would, it is
submitted, certainly violate section 703(a) even after Weber. 100
Thus, under Weber it is clear that a private employer may adopt a vol-
untary affirmative action scheme which is designed to alleviate racial imbal-
ances in traditionally segregated job classes-at least where the employer
has contributed to these conditions within his workforce. 10 ' However, other
than listing the positive aspects of the Kaiser plan, the Court provided little
guidance to assist employers in determining what other types of affirmative
action plans are permissible.10 2 Consequently, whether or not some very
95. See 118 CONG. REG. 1661-76 (1972) (amendment number 829, proposed by Sen. Ervin,
defeated 42-22), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1972, supra note 13, at 1017.
96. See generally Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 353-55 &
n.28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussion of 1972 amendments).
97. 99 S. Ct. at 2724-25, 2730.
98. Id. at 2725, 2730. In the area around the Kaiser plant at Gramercy, Louisiana, approxi-
mately 39% of the labor force was black. Id. at 2725. At Kaiser, only 15% of the employees in
general and only 2% of the craft workers were black. Id.
99. Kaiser had in the past required a minimum of five years experience for the craft jobs. 99
S. Ct. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This requirement was arguably a violation of Title VII
because 1) it operated to exclude minorities; 2) it probably could not have been justified by
Kaiser as being related to job performance; and 3) it most likely contributed to the dispropor-
tionate amount of minority craft workers in the Gramercy area. See id. Similar requirements
which operated to exclude minorities were found to violate Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). For a discussion of Griggs, see notes 17-21 and accompanying
text supra.
100. It is suggested that a plan whose sole purpose is to maintain a racial balance would
violate § 703(a) because such a plan would discriminate against a person on the basis of race,
and, unlike the Kaiser plan, would not be created for the purpose of redressing the effects of
prior discriminatory acts. See 99 S. Ct. at 2726. The Kaiser plan will cease once the effects of
past discrimination are eradicated. See id. at 2730. For the text of § 703(a), see note 7 supra.
101. See 99 S. Ct. at 2730; notes 99-100 and accompanying text supra.
102. See 99 S. Ct. at 2730; notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that
employers in the future will also have the guidance of the EEOC Affirmative Action guidelines.
44 Fed. Reg. 4422 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1608). If an employer follows these
guidelines in good faith he will be protected against a suit by the EEOC. See 44 Fed. Reg. at
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common schemes will be upheld is not yet certain. Consider, for instance, a
plan which allows a minority employee to be promoted to a management
position, even though a white employee was better qualified on the basis of
work performance and nondiscriminatory tests.' 0 3 Although this type of
plan may satisfy the four aspects noted by the Weber Court,' 04 the facts are
so different that the Court might not uphold such a scheme.' 0 5 Assuming
that the promotion criteria have been nondiscriminatory in the past, this
plan would permit an employer to discriminate in favor of a less qualified
employee solely on the basis of race. It is submitted that such a plan is not
protected under Weber, since it contains no remedial aspect to justify its
discriminatory effects. 106
Another problem raised by the holding in Weber is that the Court pro-
vided no criteria to aid an employer in deciding whether a job class is "tradi-
tionally segregated." It is thus submitted that employers and the lower
courts will probably rely upon Justice Blackmun's "arguable violation" ap-
proach, rather than the majority's "traditionally segregated" job category
standard, in determining the validity of affirmative action plans.' 0 7  The
4426 (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1608.2, . 10). The guidelines provide that prior to enacting
an aflirmative action plan, the employer will determine whether his employment practices tend
to exclude, disadvantage, restrict, or result in adverse impact on previously excluded groups, or
leave uncorrected the effects of prior discrimination. Id. (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4).
If so, the employer has a reasonable basis to set up an affirmative action plan which has a
reasonable relationship to the problems disclosed by self-analysis. Id. Thus, it is significant to
note that the Supreme Court has given great deference to EEOC interpretations in the past.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
140-45 (1976) (Court refused to accept certain EEOC guidelines because they conflicted with
prior guidelines and were not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII).
103. The use of tests as grounds for a promotion is permitted under Title VII, if they
examine qualifications which are job related. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
105. In Weber, the Kaiser affirmative action plan only affected employees on the seniority
list, whereas the minimum score requirement of the hypothetical would be part of a merit
system of promotion. This difference is significant in that seniority systems of promotion are
arbitrary, and the only reason they are valid under Title VII is that § 703(h) protects seniority
systems. For the text of § 703(h), see note 21 supra. It is contended that, under § 703(a), the
white employee's better job qualifications cannot be ignored solely on the basis of his race when
there is no finding of prior discrimination by the employer. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v.
Young, 48 U.S.L.W. 2277 (6th Cir. 1979) (court upheld, without discussion, a program very
similar to the hypothetical).
106. It is submitted that the Weber Court was probably influenced by evidence that Kaiser
may have been guilty of discriminatory hiring practices in the past by requiring five years prior
craft experience to work as a craftsman at Kaiser. See 99 S. Ct. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); note 99 and accompanying text supra. Since the employer in the hypothetical had never
discriminated previously, it appears that it would be difficult to get a majority of the Court to
uphold such a plan.
107. 99 S. Ct. at 2732 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a discussion of the "arguable violation"
approach, see notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra. Any plan which meets Justice
Blackmun's "arguable violation" standard would certainly be agreeable to the other four mem-
bers of the Weber majority, because the majority's more liberal standard encompasses the "ar-
guable violation" theory. See text accompanying note 52 supra. Recently, the Sixth Circuit used
the "arguable violation" approach to uphold an affirmative action plan in Detroit Police Officers
Ass'n v. Young, 48 U.S.L.W. 2277 (6th Cir. 1979).
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majority's standard is very difficult to apply because an employer must first
determine the relevant geographic market' 0 8 in order to decide who should
be counted in the job category. It is also unclear what criteria the majority
would consider in determining whether the job class is traditionally segre-
gated.' 09 Justice Blackmun's analysis, on the other hand, narrows the scope
of inquiry to the prior hiring practices of this employer,110 thus avoiding
many of the problems inherent in the majority's standard. Nevertheless,
while Justice Blackmun's approach is appealing, it is suggested that caution
must be exercised when requiring an employer to prove an "arguable viola-
tion" to justify an affirmative action plan. If the required proof is too
specific, an employer may become subject to suit for his prior "arguable
violations," thereby decreasing the likelihood that such an employer would
be willing to voluntarily engage in affirmative action plans. Therefore, it is
submitted that Justice Blackmun's caveat to keep the standard of proof "low
enough to permit the employer to prove it without obligating himself to pay
a damage award," should be heeded by those courts applying the "arguable
violation" standard."'
It is important to note that Weber only applies to private affirmative
action plans; 112 a significant question left open by the Court is the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action plans in state employment situations. 1 3 In
1972, Congress amended Title VII to include within the definition of
"employer," state governments, governmental agencies, and political sub-
divisions. 4  Since the 1972 amendments incorporate the fourteenth
amendment into Title VII with regard to state employment, 1 5 it is submit-
ted that the Court will not be bound by Weber-which was based on the
1964 commerce clause legislation' 16-when determining the constitutional-
ity of voluntary state affirmative action plans. 1 1 7
108. For example, an employer located twenty miles from a major metropolitan area would
be required to make the difficult determination of whether the job class consists of workers
residing in the city, or just those living in the suburbs. See 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
109. Since Title VII is only applicable to remedy discriminatory practices which occurred
after July 2, 1965, see note 5 supra, it can be argued that only activities occurring after that
date should be considered in determining whether a job class is segregated. See 99 S. Ct. at
2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
110. 99 S. Ct. at 2732-34 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
112. See note 40 supra.
113. See 99 S. Ct. at 2729 n.6; note 40 supra.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1976); note 14 supra.
115. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976).
116. See 99 S. Ct. at 2729 n.6; note 40 supra.
117. It is submitted that the proper standard to apply in considering the constitutionality of
state affirmative action plans can probably be deciphered from the Bakke opinions. It is not
clear, however, whether Justice Powell's test of strict scrutiny or Justice Brennan's intermediate
test of important governmental objectives will prevail as the means for scrutinizing such schemes.
Compare 438 U.S. at 291 (Powell, J., writing for the Court) with 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See note 36 supra. In applying the strict scrutiny test
in Bakke, Justice Powell maintained that a university was not competent to determine if an
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The Weber decision, it is suggested, adopts a strong policy against judi-
cial interference in the area of private employment decisions. The outcome
of Weber, it is submitted, was required both politically and practically, since
our court system is too overburdened to require a judicial finding of dis-
crimination every time an employer wishes to remedy his past violations of
Title VII. It is suggested that society will benefit by the majority's decision
to allow employers and employee representatives to make an attempt at
remedying the effects of discrimination in employment.
Penny Tannenbaum
identifiable discrimination had occurred. See 438 U.S. at 307-08; note 36 supra. With respect to
a state affirmative action plan, on the other hand, Justice Powell might be more willing to
accept Justice Brennan's intermediate test, since a state is competent to determine whether it
has violated the constitutional and statutory rights of its employees. See note 36 supra.
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